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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
After trial in 1984, the court awarded the marital home 
to the plaintiff who was ordered to pay the value of one-half of 
the equity of the parties to the defendant over four years at 12% 
interest. Two years after the Decree was entered and prior to 
the sale of the home, the plaintiff was advised that, as the 
result of errors in the parties1 tax returns and the disallowance 
of tax deductions and credits, the parties face a liability to 
the IRS of about $60,000.00, The plaintiff requested the trial 
court to modify the Decree to pay the tax liability from the 
proceeds of sale of the home and divide the balance. The court 
refused to modify the Decree and plainti'ff contends the trial 
court erred in refusing to modify the Decree of Divorce as 
requested. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATION^ 
Section 30-3-5(3) UTAH CODE ANN. (1953): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders . . .or the 
distribution of the property as is reasonable 
and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced from each other by a Decree 
of Divorce entered on February 29f 1984, (R. 329-331). The 
divorce was severed from the other issues which came before the 
court for trial on May 21 and 22f 1985 (R. 377-378). The Court 
determined how the property of the parties would be divided by 
Memorandum Decision (R. 380-384) and Supplemental Findings of 
Factr Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
were entered on August 23, 1984 (R. 385-394, 397-402). These 
provided the home of the parties at 1522 Roxbury Road was awarded 
to the plaintiff (R. 400), one-half of the Geothermal Associates1 
partnership was awarded to each of the parties (R. 400-401) and 
plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant $67,500.00 for 
one-half of the home equity in four annual payments of $16,875.00 
plus interest at 12% (R. 400-401). 
In June of 1986, the plaintiff, after learning of IRS 
claims for approximately $60,000.00 in taxes claimed due as a 
result of errors in the tax returns and ownership of the parties 
in Geothermal Associates, moved to vacate the applicable 
provisions of the Decree and to order utilization of the proceeds 
of sale of the home (which was under a contract of sale), to pay 
the taxes that were due, then to divide the remainder equally 
(R. 463-474, 475-531, 532-535). The defendant filed a cross 
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motion to enforce the Decree (R. 540-542), opposed the motion to 
modify (R. 543-546) and moved for the entry of judgment for the 
second installment due to her under the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce (R. 558-559), These motions were heard by Judge Conder 
on June 12, 1986, and denied from the bench (R. 586-604). 
By an order entered June 24, 1986, the plaintiff's 
motion to amend the Supplemental Decrtee was denied, the 
plaintiff's motion to use the money received from the sale of the 
home to pay the taxes was denied, the defendant's motion to 
accelerate the payment schedule set out in the Supplemental 
Decree was denied and the request of the defendant for attorney's 
fees was denied (R. 570-573). Subsequently, Judge Conder entered 
an order staying execution on portions of the judgment with the 
result that defendant received $35,688.12 from the proceeds of 
sale and an escrow fund of $71,719.27 was established pending 
resolution of this appeal (R. 562-563A). 
The plaintiff contends the refusal to amend the Decree 
of Divorce was an error under the criteria articulated by this 
Court in Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (1980); Land v. Land, 
605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); and Lea v. feowers, 658 P.2d 1213 
(1983). Equity required amendment of the Decree of Divorce and 
subsequent orders and judgments of the court as requested by the 
plaintiff, that is, to pay the unexpected taxes that had been 
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incurred, then to divide the balance of the proceeds of sale 
equally between the parties rather than throw the whole burden of 
the decline in value of the home and the taxes on the 
plaintiff-appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on February 29, 
1984 (R. 329-331), and the custody, division of property and 
support aspects of the case went to trial before Judge Dean 
Conder of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on May 21 and 22, 1984 (R. 377, 378). At the 
conclusion of trial, custody of the four minor children of the 
parties was awarded to the plaintiff, Dr. Miner, subject to lib-
eral visitation rights in their mother, the defendant (R. 378). 
The court published a Memomrandum Decision on June 5, 
1984, deciding the issues under advisement (R. 380-384). The 
court awarded the home of the parties at 1522 Roxbury Road to the 
plaintiff subject to an equitable interest of $67,500.00 
(one-half of the equity of the parties in the home) to the 
defendant (R. 380-381). This was ordered paid in four annual 
installments of $16,875.00 plus interest at 12%; the first pay-
ment was due June 1, 1985, and each June 1 thereafter until paid 
in full (R. 382). The court concluded its Memorandum Decision 
declaring that the division of property was effected in an 
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attempt to divide the assets of the parties equally between them 
(R. 383). 
Supplemental Findings of Fact ana Conclusions of Law 
(R. 385-394) were entered on August 23, 19^4, and a Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce entered that same date |(R. 397-402). In the 
i 
Supplemental Decree the plaintiff was awarded the home of the 
parties, (11 7, (R. 400)), and each of the parties was awarded 
one-half of Geothermal Associates (11 8 and K 10, R. 400-401). 
The plaintiff was ordered to pay certain specified debts (R. 401) 
and each of the parties was ordered to pay their own debts since 
separation (R. 401). Finally, the payment of the defendant's 
equity was formalized as per the Memorandum Decision of the court 
(11 14, R. 401). 
The parties, by themselves or With the assistance of 
the court, resolved issues regarding division of the retirement 
account of the plaintiff and their personal property plus certain 
visitation problems (R. 395-396, 403-406, 407-413, 414-415, 
416-425 and 430-434). 
On June 11, 1985, the defendant moved the court to 
enter judgment for the first payment of $16,875.00 plus interest 
of $8,100.00 (R. 426-427). The plaintiff moved the court to 
amend judgment regarding division of the ecjuity of the parties in 
the house as he had been required, because of the dissolution of 
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the medical group in which he had been practicing, to move to 
Wichita Falls, Texas, (with the children); had not been able to 
sell the house; had been required to purchase a home in Wichita 
Falls; and the marital home remained empty, yet plaintiff had to 
maintain the house payments (R. 438-439, 446-449). Plaintiff 
requested that the home be sold and when sold, the equity be 
divided between the parties (R. 438-439, 451-456). 
The cross motions of the parties were heard on 
August 5, 1985, by the Commissioner who recommended that judgment 
be entered for the defendant for $16,875.00 plus interest of 
$8,100.00 and that the motion to amend by the plaintiff be denied 
(R. 450). The matter then went before Judge Conder who adopted 
the recommendations of the Commissioner stating in a minute 
entry: 
Because of changes in his professional work, 
the plaintiff has vacated the home and moved 
to Texas. Business exigencies may have dic-
tated the move but the choice was certainly 
the plaintiff's. This court finds no reason 
to deny the defendant her judgment under the 
circumstances. 
(R. 458). This ruling was implemented by an order and a judgment 
which were entered on September 25, 1985 (R. 459-460, 461-462). 
No appeal was taken from that Ruling. 
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On June 4, 1986f the plaintiff moved the court for 
relief from judgment on the grounds that the home had been sold 
for a gross selling price of $215,000.00, which was $20,000.00 
less than the court had determined was the equity of the parties 
and on the further ground that the Geothern^ al Associates interest 
which the court divided equally between the| parties and which had 
produced tax deductions and tax credits for the parties in 1981, 
1982 and 1983 had been disallowed which produced a projected 
$60,000.00 tax liability for the parties. Specifically, the 
plaintiff had been informed of an error in the 1981 tax return 
and the Geothermal Associates deductions and credits had been 
disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service which produced an 
additional tax, interest and penalties of $20,767.15 for 1981, 
and an additional penalty which could not be determined but which 
would be in the approximate sum of $19,000.00 and similar charges 
should be expected for 1982 in the sum of $10,584.69 with addi-
tional claims being anticipated for 1|983 of approximately 
$10,000.00. In total, a claim of taxes, interest and penalties, 
the accountant for the plaintiff advised him, would be approxi-
mately $60,000.00 (R. 463-474, 475-571, 531-535). These allega-
tions were supported by specific exhibits, the Internal Revenue 
Service documents, the tax accountant's work papers and the sales 
documents regarding the home (R. 463-474 and 475-571). 
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In response, the defendant filed a motion to enforce 
the Decree (R. 540-542), a reply to the motion to amend 
(R. 543-546) and a motion for judgment for the second of the four 
installments, $16,875.00 plus interest of $6,075.00 (R. 558-559). 
The motions were heard by Judge Dean E. Conder on 
June 12, 1986 (R. 585-604) who denied all of the motions 
(R. 599-603). The ruling of the court was thereafter formalized 
by an Order entered June 24, 1986 (R. 571-573) in which he denied 
the plaintiff's motion to amend the Decree (R. 572), denied the 
motion of the plaintiff to use the proceeds of sale in the home 
to pay the taxes (R. 572), denied the defendant's motion to 
accelerate the installment payments (R. 573) and denied the 
request of the defendant for attorney's fees (R. 573). 
On June 18, 1986, in order to permit the sale of the 
home to be completed, the court entered an Order staying execu-
tion under paragraphs 10 and 14 of the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce but required payment to the defendant of $35,688.12 of 
the proceeds; to-wit, the $8,500.00 required under the Order of 
June 20, 1985, and the judgment of September 25, 1985 (plus 
accrued interest to date, $27,188.12) (R. 562-563A). The 
remainder of the proceeds of the sale of the home, $71,719.27 
were placed in escrow pending resolution of this matter 
(R. 562-563A). 
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Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal of the ruling of 
the court on July 11, 1986 (R. 578-579). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The standards articulated by this Court for the equi-
table modification of a decree of divorce when there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances not coritemplated by the court 
or parties at the time of the entry of the Decree require the 
modification of the Decree to pay the taxes assessed to the par-
ties from the proceeds of sale of the marital home and to divide 
any remaining funds between the parties. In refusing to do so, 
the trial court erred and this Court should now correct that 
error. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
AMENDED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO REQUIRE PAYMENT 
OF THE TAXES ASSESSED TO BOTH OF THE PARTIES 
FROM THE PROCEEDS OF SALE OF THE HOME TO 
EFFECT ITS INTENT OF EQUALLY DIVIDING THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
This Court has ruled construing and applying 
S 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) that a decree of divorce may 
be modified upon the showing of "substantial change in circum-
stances of the parties occurring since the entry of the Decree 
and not contemplated in the Decree itself." Lea v. Bowers, 658 
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P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983). The court, quoting from its prior 
decision of Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) observed: 
It is likewise true that the court retains 
continuing jurisdiction over the parties and 
may modify the decree due to a change in 
circumstances, equitable considerations again 
to govern. 
658 P.2d at 1215. In the instant case, appellant requested the 
court to modify the Decree based on a change in circumstances, 
that is, a substantial tax obligation being asserted by the 
Internal Revenue Service against the parties for years in which 
they had filed joint returns which was not known to them at the 
time of trial. This is not a situation where this Court or the 
trial court were asked to construe the Decree, Zaharias v. 
Zaharias, 652 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982), or where the court is asked 
to reopen the case because of an alleged failure to produce 
information leading to an error in judgment, Christensen v. 
Christensen, 619 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1980). This is a case such as 
the court confronted in Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 
1985), where there was a substantial change of circumstances, 
i.e., the change of custody of one child and visitation for sub-
stantial periods of time by the other child with the 
non-custodial mother which led this Court to determine that a 
substantial change of circumstances had occurred. This ruling 
-10-
required vacation of the order refusing modification of the 
decree and a remand to the trial court to determine whether or 
not the mother should be awarded immediately her equity from the 
home of the parties rather than waiting as required by the 
Decree, that is, when the youngest chii^ attained 18 years or the 
home was sold. As this Court stated: 
Under the facts of this case, the change in 
child custody and visitation rights since the 
original decree amounts to a substantial 
change in circumstances occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in 
the decree itself. 
713 P.2d at 702. 
Another analogous case is that of Chandler v. West, 610 
P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980). In Chandler, the parties had entered into 
a stipulated decree which provided that the plaintiff should be 
awarded the parties' home and that the defendant would make all 
mortgage payments on the property. Thereafter, Shirley West 
Chandler sold the home for a gain of $14,000.00 and remarried. 
The defendant then stopped making the mortgage payments. 
Mrs. West brought the defendant before the court asking that he 
be required to continue making payments until he had paid her the 
total of the amount of the mortgage indebtedness as of the date 
of the divorce. The defendant responded that the remarriage of 
the plaintiff and the sale of the home constituted a material 
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change in circumstances justifying a modification of the decree. 
The trial court declined to modify the decree. 
This Court noted that in its prior decision of Land v. 
Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), it had ruled that while property 
settlements are entitled to greater sanctimony than alimony and 
support payments they are not sacrosanct and it is not beyond the 
power of the trial court of equity to modify them. 610 P.2d at 
1300. The Opinion continued that the court was dealing not with 
distribution of specific assets pursuant to a property settlement 
but an order for the payment of a monthly mortgage obligation. 
It was observed that if the payment was support, the trial court 
could eliminate that payment if support was no longer required 
and if it were a property division and there were obviously 
changed circumstances, under traditional equity standards it 
could be modified, citing Le Breton v. Le Breton, 604 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1979) 610 P.2d at 1300. The Court then remanded the case 
for specific findings and conclusions regarding the character of 
the required payments. 
Examination of the instant matter against Stettler v. 
Stettler, supra, and Chandler v. West, supra, demonstrates the 
error of the trial court. First and foremost, Stettler v. 
Stettler, supra, and Chandler v. West, supra, presented the case 
of a Decree based upon a stipulation and property settlement 
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agreement while in the instant matter the court was being asked 
to reexamine its own decision. The significance of this dis-
tinction is demonstrated by this Court's decisions in Despain v. 
Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981) and Despain v. Despain, 610 
P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980), as well as Land v. Land, supra, where it 
was clearly stated that once the parties reach an agreement it 
can be modified only when there is a significant change of cir-
cumstances. In both Despain decisions, Land v. Land, supra, and 
Chandler v. West, supra, the court found it significant that the 
parties reached an overall integrated agreement and modification 
of any particular part should not be undertaken without examina-
tion of how the whole agreement fit together. 
In the instant matter, the Decree was entered after 
trial. Thus, no issue of what the parties intended in their 
stipulation is presented. The court declared its intent to 
divide the marital estate equally (R. 383). Now an unknown debt, 
taxes, have upset that award. In this regard, this case is 
analogous to that of Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 
1985) where an obligation to pay a debt was not considered at the 
time of the divorce. Examining that situation, this Court ruled 
that the trial court correctly modified the decree to provide for 
payment of the unrecognized obligation. That decision was 
affirmed by this Court. 709 P.2d at 361. In the instant case, 
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the trial court refused to follow the teachings of this Court and 
refused to consider this change of circumstances or forgotten 
obligation. 
The action of the trial court is exacerbated by its 
failure to comply with its own declaration. Judge Conder 
announced as part of his decision that his goal was to divide the 
assets equally (R. 383f 393). However, when faced with the 
motion to modify the Decree because there had been a significant 
change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties, that is, 
a major tax liability which neither of the parties knew existed 
and which sprang from the ownership of an asset the court divided 
equally between them, Geothermal Associates, the court refused to 
modify its decision. 
As Judge Conder said: 
I don't propose to now go back and redis-
tribute assets . . . because I attempt as 
best I can, and that, as weak as it is, to 
try and make a division of assets when I hear 
the case. 
(R. 599). 
Considering the tax liability problem itself the trial 
court said: 
As to the tax liability, I think it would be 
a horrendous obligation at this time to try 
to decide who has got what taxes to pay. 
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(R. 600). Finally, the court stated: 
I'm going to deny the modification and let 
the chips fall where they may on the tax 
matter. 
(R. 602). 
Whether considered to be a motion to modify based on a substan-
tial change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties or 
the court at the time that Judge Conder rendered his decision, 
Stettler v. Stettler, supra, or an obligation which had been 
overlooked by the parties and the court at the time of the entry 
of the Decree, Thompson v. Thompson, suprpf the court erred in 
refusing to modify the Decree, an error which should be corrected 
by this Court. 
A second major distinction which the trial court 
refused to acknowledge is that the effect of the tax debt is to 
unbalance the division of assets. The trial court ordered pay-
ments from the plaintiff to the defendant to effect an equal 
division of the marital estate. Yet, wheni confronted with what 
it acknowledged as a "horrendous obligatiori" (R. 600), it refused 
to modify its own decision to resolve this (unanticipated problem. 
No remand in this case can be made to determine what 
the parties intended as in Chandler v. Wqst, supra. Nor is a 
remand to determine what is necessary tp correct the present 
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situation required as the court determined appropriate in Le 
Breton v. Le Breton, supra. This Court has all of the informa-
tion before it now that is necessary to do equity in this case. 
Appellant requested the court to resolve the matter by 
payment of the taxes from proceeds of sale of the home, the last 
unliquidated asset in a method that would effect the equitable 
division of property the court had stated it intended to make. 
The trial court, rejecting principles of equity and fairness 
which it stated it was following in its decision, refused to do 
so. 
This becomes even more clear when this Court examines 
the effect of the trial court's decision. Since the home sold 
for substantially below what the parties believed it was worth at 
the time of trial ($20,000.00), the award of four payments of 
$16,875.00 plus interest, $27,188.12 of which has been delivered, 
effect an award to the defendant of all of the $102,000.00 
received when the home was sold. Instead of dividing the assets 
equally, the defendant has been awarded the actual equity of the 
parties in the home and by refusing to enter any order regarding 
the taxes, the court has left that liability in the hands of the 
plaintiff who has been dealing with the Internal Revenue Service. 
The net effect of this ruling is to transfer to the defendant 
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approximately $160f000.00 of the marital estate at the expense of 
the plaintiff. 
The trial court, in order to carry out its intent of 
equitable division of the property of the parties should have 
vacated the provisions of HU 8 and 10 of the Supplemental Decree, 
its judgment of September 25, 1985, and simply permitted the home 
to be sold, pay the taxes from the proceeds and then divide the 
remaining funds equally between the plaintiff and defendant. It 
failed to do so and, in fact, has turned over to defendant 
$35,688.12 based on its Order of June 21, 1985, and the judgment 
of September 25, 1985. 
Under the standards articulatdd by this Court in 
Thompson v. Thompson, supra; Stettler v. Stettlery supra; Land v. 
Land, supra; Chandler v. West, supra; and Lea v. Bowers, supra, 
the decision of the trial court must no\|r be reversed by this 
Court which should order that the taxes be paid from the remain-
ing escrow proceeds of sale and after they are paid, the plain-
tiff should be allowed an amount equal to the sum taken by the 
defendant on her judgment of September 25; 1985. The remaining 
proceeds, if any, should be divided equally between the parties. 
If the proceeds of sale are insufficient to give the plaintiff an 
amount equal to that taken by the defendant as execution on her 
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judgment, she should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff a com-
pensatory amount to equalize the distribution of property. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this case, the trial court erred in refusing to 
amend the Decree of Divorce to effect equity between the parties. 
As a result of circumstances beyond the control of the parties, 
the marital home sold for $20,000.00 less than the court believed 
it was worth at the time of the entry of the Decree. In addi-
tion, the parties face assessment of taxes, interest and penal-
ties in the neighborhood of $60,000.00 from the Internal Revenue 
Service as a result of a disallowance of deductions and credits 
taken in years the parties were married. This was not antici-
pated by them at the time of the divorce. 
The Decree in this matter was not entered by the court 
pursuant to agreement of the parties. It was the ruling of the 
court. It should, therefore, be more susceptible to modification 
by the court when confronted with these circumstances. 
This Court should effect the required modification and 
order that the proceeds of sale of the home presently in escrow 
be utilized to pay the taxes, interest and penalties that are 
determined due the Internal Revenue Service for the years 1981, 
1982 and 1983. The remaining proceeds, if any, should then be 
paid to the plaintiff until he has received an amount equal to 
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that taken by the defendant from the proceeds of sale under the 
order of the trial court permitting execution on the judgment 
entered September 25, 1985 ($27,188.12). If there are then pro-
ceeds remaining, they should be divided equally between the par-
ties. If the proceeds remaining after payment of the taxes are 
less than enough to equalize the payment made to the defendant, 
she should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff an equalizing 
amount. I 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this k. day of October, 1986. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ J— 
of and for ^ 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to 
the following on this fc day of October, 1986: 
B. L. Dart, Jr. 
DART, ADAMSON S< PARKEN 
310 South Main, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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FILED IN CLEFTS OFFICE 
Ge't L~ :*o Cnt'o.ty Utah 
J UN 5 1384 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-83-2353 
This Court in furtherance of its oral decision in this case 




*1. The home located at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, UT, 
2. The Scout automobile. 
3. The furniture and fixtures located in the house #1. 
4. His IRA account. 
5. One-half of the food storage. 
6. One-half of the paintings. 
7. His gun collection. 
8. Camera and equipment. 
9. One-half of the profit sharing acbount in the sum of 
$67,678.00. 
•Subject to the equity interest granted to defendant. 
MINER VS. MINER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
10. Stock received from his parents, per Exhibit 6. 
11. One-half interest in Geothermal Tax Shelter. 
To Defendant: 
1. An equity interest in the home of $67,500.00 to be 
secured and paid as hereinafter set forth. The Court 
acknowledges that this recognizes a $4,480.00 obligation 
to Mr. G. M. Thomas, assigned to A. H. Miner. This 
was an obligation signed by both parties as a lien against 
the property. 
2. The Honda automobile. 
3. The two bank accounts at First Security Bank totaling 
$5,637.00. 
4. One-half of the food storage to be divided on the same 
terms as set forth orally in court regarding the division 
of the paintings. 
5. One-half of the paintings. 
6. China, crystal and silverware. 
7. Sporting equipment. 
8. One-half of the profit sharing account in the amount 
of $67,678.00, to be distributed as hereinafter set forth. 
9. One-half interest in the Geothermal Tax Shelter. 
Obligations: 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay the following and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom: 
1. Visa account. 
3 
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2. Fort Douglas account. 
3. Deseret Foundation obligation. 
4. Any and all sums due to his parents or family. 
Defendant is ordered to pay the following and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
1. Any and all sums due to her parents or family. 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the defendant as 
follows: $1,000.00 per month for 2-H months commencing with 
June 1984, and then the sum of $500.00 per month for 2- months. 
The defendant's equity in the home i's ordered to be paid 
in four quarterly installments of $16,875.00 principal, plus 
accrued interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance v/ith the 
first payment to be paid on or before June 1, 1985, and each 
June 1st until the obligation is paid in full. Interest to 
commence from the date hereof. 
The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendant $67,678.00 
(being one-half of the profit sharing account) to be paid as 
follows: $1,000.00 per month beginning June 1, 1988. Said 
payments to be applied first to accrued interest and the balance 
to principal. Interest shall accrue from the date hereof at 
10% per annum. 
Each party to bear his or her own costs and fees. 
MINER VS. MINER PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court has attempted to divide the marital estate 
approximately equally between the parties. The Court recognizes 
that this is not done with mathematical precision, it is what this 
Court considers to be equitable. 
Dated this day of June, 1984. 
x. ^&^J^ 
DEAN E\ CONDER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
A"»TfLT 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this &? day of June, 1984: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Defendant 
430 Ten West Broadway Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
cJy 7 ^ / / 
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DAVID S . D0L0V7ITZ ( 0 8 9 9 ) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. D-83-2353 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for 
trial on May 21 and May 22, 1984, the Honorable Dean E. Conder 
presiding. The plaintiff was present in person and represented 
by counsel David S. Dolowitz. The defendant was present in 
person and represented by counsel B. L. Dart, Jr. The Court 
heard and considered the testimony of each of the parties and 
the witnesses offered in their behalf, reviewed and considered 
the exhibits accepted into evidence on behalf of each of the 
parties, heard arguments of counsel and considered the legal 
and factual arguments presented to the Court in written and 
oral form, after having previously granted a decree of divorc 
to each of the parties and now being advised in the premise 
and having published its memorandum decision on the 5th day o 
June, 1984, makes and enters the following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Each of the parties is a capable parent. Th 
four minor children born to the parties during their marriage 
Barbara, Katie, David and Krista, desire to live with th' 
plaintiff and the Court has been advised by each of the menta, 
health professionals who have evaluated the children that ii 
would be in their best interest that the children be placed ii 
the care, custody and control of their father and that it ii 
important that the children who need each other be kept 
together as a family unit. 
2. T&te ete-^ enddiit mr& suffered—-=-&££ua—>r^^otinnal 
pi*0b±«frs—drw-i-ftg—fe4*o—carriage—em^i Vi.it.ti on should be estab-
lished to protect both her and the children of the parties. 
3. The defendant shall have the right to visit with 
the minor children of the parties on a reasonable and liberal 
basis which visitation should be carefully defined as Barbara 
and Katie are older and have their own social life and academic 
needs while David and Krista are younger and should have joint 
visitation with the defendant. 
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4. Each of the parties are advised by the Court to 
obtain counseling to help them to relate to the children and 
not allow their feelings about each other to interfere with the 
relationship of a child with the other parent as the Court 
finds that this would be in the interest of the children but 
this will not be an order of the Court. 
5. The Court determines that the defendant has on 
numerous occasions gone to the home that had been occupied by 
the parties during their marriage as a family home at 1522 
Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that this disrupted the 
family routine and caused difficulty for the children, the 
plaintiff and the housekeeper employed by the plaintiff. 
6. The parties acquired during their marriage 
certain marital assets which should be divided between them. 
These are a home and real property located at 1522 Roxbury 
Road; a Scout automobile; the furniture, fixtures, furnishings 
and appliances located at the home at 1522 Roxsbury Road, Salt 
Lake City, Utah; an IRA account opened by the plaintiff; food 
storage; paintings; a gun collection; cameras and photographic 
equipment; a profit sharing account which the Court found had a 
value after substraction of loans of $135,356 which sum, how-
ever, if withdrawn from the pension and profit sharing account 
would have been subject to taxation at a rate of 57% because of 
the federal and state taxation adainst said sum and would 
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probably be subjected to a further 10% penalty tax; 
Geothermal tax shelter; a Honda automobile; two bank accounts 
at First Security Bank that together total $5,637; china, 
crystal and silverware; and sporting equipment. 
7. The plaintiff, prior to and during his marriage 
to the defendant, was given by- his parents bonds and commor 
stock, the dividends and interest from which helped to finance 
his education and the expenses of the marriage of the parties. 
8. The parties incurred various debts and obliga-
tions which specifically included a VISA account, a Fort 
Douglas Membership account, a pledge to the Deseret Foundation, 
and various sums loaned to the parties by the parents of the 
plaintiff. 
9. The defendant is currently unemployed but has 
erned a college degree and is taking classes that will certify 
her as a teacher and she is seeking employment which she 
believes will produce an income of approximately $17,000 a year. 
10. The plaintiff is a physician who earned, during 
the year of 1983, $139,104.00. 
11. Each of the parties incurred court costs and 
attorneys' fees in prosecuting this matter before the Court. 
From the foregoing facts, the Court now makes and 
enters the following as its 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Care, custody and control of the minor children 
of the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, their 
father, subject to reasonable and liberal rights of visitation 
in the defendant which should be for David and Krista, and, if 
they so desire, Barbara and Katie: 
a. Every other Saturday morning at 9:00 a.m. 
until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Every other red letter holiday and the 24th 
of July, with the exception of Mother's Day which should always 
be spent with the defendant and father's Day which should 
always be spent with the plaintiff. 
c. The children may visit with their mother 
during the week as they (the children) desire but they must 
notify the plaintiff or his housekeeper that they are visiting 
and must be home by dinner time. 
d. The defendant should have the right to a 
summer visitation period which shalll not exceed two weeks and 
this should be planned with the children to take into account 
their schedules. 
e. The plaintiff sh&ll have a right to take a 
summer trip with the children of at least two weeks duration. 
-5-
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f. The defendant is admonished and requested t 
plan meaningful activities with and for the children when the 
are visiting with her. 
g. Barbara and Katie should work out sue 
visitation with the defendant as they deem mutually desirable, 
h. All visitation between the defendant, Davi 
and Krista should be arranged to that David and Krista alway 
visit the defendant together. 
2. Each of the parties to this matter, the plaintif: 
and the defendant, should be enjoined and prohibited froi 
making derogatory remarks about the other to the children aboui 
the other parent. 
3. Each of the parties in this matter should b( 
enjoined and prohibited from using the children to get back at 
the other parent. 
4. Neither party should annoy, harass the other oi 
make physical contact with the other. 
5. The defendant should be enjoined and prohibited 
from going on or about the property at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, except as incident to picking up or returning 




6. The defendant at this itime should not be ordered 
to pay any child support to the plaintiff for and on behalf of 
the children. 
7. The home and real property located at 1522 
Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah should be awarded to the 
plaintiff subject to the equitable I interest of the defendant 
which shall be paid as is hereinafter set out. 
8. The plaintiff should be awarded the Scout auto-
mobile, the furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances 
located in the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
except as are herein awarded specifically to the defendant; his 
IRA account; one-half of the food storage; one-half of the 
paintings; his gun collection; his camera and photographing 
equipment; one-half of the profit sharing account, to-wit, 
$67,678 subject to the provisions for division of this account 
as are herein set out; one-half of his interest in the 
Geothermal tax shelter. 
9. All of the stock received by the plaintiff from 
his parents either before or during the marriage should be 
awarded to him as his sole and separate property as said 
property is not part of the marital estate. 
10. The defendant should be awarded an equity 
interest in the home of the parties valued at $67,500 to be 
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paid as is herein set out; the Honda automobile; the two banl 
accounts at First Security Bank totalling $5,637; one-half oi 
the food storage; one-half of the paintings; the china, crystal 
and silverware; the sporting equipment and one-half of the 
profit sharing account in the amount of $67,678 which should be 
distributed as is hereinafter set forth and one-half interest 
of the parties in the Geothermal tax shelter. 
11. The plaintiff should be required to pay, assume 
and hold harmless the defendant from the following debts and 
obligations: the debt to his father, A. U. Miner, in the 
amount of $4,480 toward the purchase of the home on Roxbury 
Road; the VISA account; the Fort Douglas Account; the Deseret 
Foundation obligation and any and all sums due to his parents 
or family. 
12. Each of the parties should be required to pay all 
debts and obligations incurred by them since their separation. 
13. The plaintiff should pay to the defendant alimony 
in the sum of $1,000 per month for 24 months commencing with 
the month of June in 1984 and then the sum of $500 per month 
for 24 months after which time alimony shall terminate. 
14. The defendant's equity in the home should be paid 
in four annual installments of $16,875 principal plus accrued 
interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance with the first 
-8-
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAJ DISTRICT COURT 
L /Si 
LAKE""COUSTY 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
SUPPLEMENT AJL, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
L . j q i 
. „.•,. r 
• i b o v e - e r t i t"! e " r 
tr 
p r e ? 
c c u n s f ' 
» : t f o r 
, Lxie H o n o r a b l e uedn r, . w o n d e r 
i^; t cor>^- •? ^ p e r s o n a^d r e p r e s e n t e d 
The d e f e n d a n t **-c r r e s e n t : n 
h e a l vii. , u ! i o i « H i r u 
• - > ' " f • s s P s ^ f f f < r e * - V "" f* W £J d f " 
;i ; t s and 
f - e ^ d e r e d 
: ^ r t i c a r g u m e n t * j u r , s c l inci c o i . s i J c r e ' i ' l e g a l 
invi i u c t u a x d i g u n i e i i t s r r e s e n t e d t o Lne C u u i t xn w n t i e n and 
oral form, after having previously granted a decree of divorce 
to each of the parties and now being advised in the premises 
and having published its memorandum decision on the 5th day oi 
June, 1984, and having made and entered its supplemental 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Care, custody and control of the minor childrer 
of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff, their father, 
subject to reasonable and liberal rights of visitation in the 
defendant which visitation shall be for David and Krista, and 
if they so desire, Barbara and Katie: 
a. Every other Saturday morning at 9:00 a.m. 
until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Every other red letter holiday and the 24tt 
of July, with the exception of Mother's Day which shall always 
be spent with the defendant and Father's Day which shall always 
be spent with the plaintiff. 
c. The children may visit with their mother 
during the week as they (the children) desire but they must 
notify the plaintiff or his housekeeper that they are visiting 
and must be home by dinner time. 
d. The defendant shall have the right to a 
summer visitation period which shall not exceed two weeks and 
this should be planned with the children to take into account 
their schedules. 
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3. Each of the parties i n this matter is enjoined 
and prohibited from usii ig the children to get back at the other 
parent. 
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6. The defendant at this time is not ordered to pa} 
any child support to the plaintiff for and on behalf of the 
children. 
7. The home and real property located at 1522 
Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah is awarded to the plaintiff 
subject to the equitable interest of the defendant which shall 
be paid as is hereinafter set out. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded the Scout automobile, 
the furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in 
the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, except as 
are herein awarded specifically to the defendant, his IRA 
account; one-half of the food storage; one-half of the 
paintings; his gun collection; his camera and photographing 
equipment; one-half of the profit sharing account, to-wit, 
$67,678 subject to the provisions for division of this account 
as are herein set out; one-half of his interest in the 
Geothermal tax shelter. 
9. All of the stock received by the plaintiff from 
his parents either before or during the marriage is awarded to 
him as his sole and separate property as said property is not 
part of the marital estate. 
10. The defendant is awarded an equity interest in 
the home of the parties valued at $67,500 to be paid as is 
herein set out; the Honda automobile; the two bank accounts at 
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15. The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendan 
the sum of $67,678 (being one-half of the profit sharin< 
account) at the rate of $1,000 per month beginning June 1, 
1988. Payments are to be applied first to accrued interesl 
which shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum, and then th< 
balance to principal. Interest shall accrue on this sum froi 
June 5, 1984. 
16. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs anc 
attorneys' fees. 
17. Each of the parties is ordered to sign al] 
documents and carry out all steps necessary to effect the 
above-stated order. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of / , 1984. 
DEAN E.l 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE ORDER OF THE COURT: 
David S. Dolowitz ^ * 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Defendant 
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$16,875 together with accrued interest to the 5th day of June, 
1985 of $8,100, a total combined amount of $24,975, which 
judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum 
from the 5th day of June, 1985 until paid. 
DATED this ^ day of Jtog^ st, 1985. 
BY THE COURT-
APPROVAL AS TO FORM; 
^V"/ } 
DISTRICT JUDGF 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ~^r 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 ) 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant shall have the right to have the minor 
children with her from the 1st of August to the 14th of August. 
The childrens' desires are to be considered insofar as there may 
be any conflict with prior existing commitments. The cost of 
transportation between plaintiff's home in Texas and defendant's 
home in California shall be divided with defendant to pay the 
cost of transporting the children to California and plaintiff to 
pay the cost of transporting the children back to Texas. 
2. Pursuant to stipulation, it is established that 
plaintiff's payments to defendant of alimony shall be due on the 
fifth day of each month for which the alimony is due and should 
be paid henceforth through the clerk of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County. 
3* Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
to change the equity entitlements of the parties in the house and 
real property at 1522 South Roxbury Road by vacating the 
provisions of paragraphs 10 and 14 of the Decree of Divorce and 
to vacate the currently outstanding judgment for $24,975, plus 
interest at 12 percent (12%) entered on August 25, 1985, is 
denied. Plaintiiff's Motion that the parties use the proceeds of 
sale from said house and real property first to pay all taxes due 
for tax years 1981, 1982, and 1983 and thereafter to divide the 
net proceeds of sale equally between the parties is denied. 
? 
I':. 
4 . D^-f f -n ^r * v t ^ *' '. *• sr r» n v o r c e 
o r i g i n a l , ; n>. ,<v ) s> ! ,•> i *< ^ r c c /* Mvor «- i s 3w i* *. 
5 . [)(J +on-^ ot t • e r - ; ' i ( i c t fo» ^ ' i i"»-^i -- t , t , j s d e n i e d , 
DATED t h i s + " ,h- > • ? .• ' 9 * 6 . 




DEAN E. CONDER 
Pi <z+ r i r> t C,0\ IT t T~ 
> ' ; 
I h e r e b y f " r t i : \ t* i ' •• '• • _ J : ^ dav o f . ' - . .v-. 1 ° R 6 , 
I m a i l e d a - - • * " " * - ^ v ^r:; O r d e r t o : 
D a v i a s . H;- J owi i ; : 
A t t o r n e y 4or P l a i r i M f f 
1 S^ Ss)\it!. St a i . St r p f t 
S u i t e 700 
S a l t Lake Ci ' Lan t%4111 




DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS L. MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROL J. MINER, 
Defendant . 
ORDER /'/fffa7/l 
Civil No. D83-2353 
Judge Dean Conder 
* * * * * * * 
The plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, by and 
through his counsel of record, havinq moved this court for a 
stay of execution on the provisions of Paragraphs 10 and 14 of 
the Supplemental Decree of Divorce made and entered on August 
23, 1984; Paragraph 3 of the Order of this court made and 
entered on June 20, 1985, except as to the monthly payments 
which commence in June of 1986; and the Judgment of this court 
made and entered on September 25, 1985, said stay to remain in 
effect during the pendency of the appeal of the decision of 
this court to deny the petition of the plaintiff to modify or 
grant relief from the Decree of Divorce and Judgments as 
determined in open court on the 12th day of June, 1986, and 
moved this court to order both parties to cooperate in 
completing the sale of the home at 1522 Roxbury Road and the 
money received thereby be placed into an interest-bearing 
escrow account to be jointly controlled by counsel for both 
parties, and this court, having considered that motion and the 
records, files and papers on file herein, now finds and 
concludes that part of the motion should be granted. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY -ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
1. A stay of execution is hereby issued as to 
Paragraphs 10 and 14 of the Decree of Divorce in regard to 
division of the equity in the home of the parties at 1522 
Roxbury Road, said stay of execution to remain in effect until 
further order of this court or resolution of the appeal of the 
decision of this court to deny relief to the plaintiff in the 
form of modifying the above-described orders or granting him 
relief from those orders as made in open court on the 12th day 
of June, 1986. 
2. The sale of the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, shall be Completed, the defendant shall be 
paid both the $8,500.00 due und^r the order of this court of 
-2-
June 20f 1985/ and the amount due ur^ der the judgment of 
September 25/ 1985/ from the proceeds of sale and the remaining 
net proceeds of sale shall be placed in an interest-bearing 
escrow account/ jointly under the control of counsel for each 
of the parties/ said account to be maintained until further 
order of this court, 
this / 0 DATED day of June, 1986. 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE 
ORDER OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for plaintiff 
B. L. DART/ JR. 
Attorney for Defendant 
i 
DEAN E. CONDER 
District Court Judge 
0366B 
-3-
